Abstract: What do humans mean when they say that time passes quickly or slowly? In this article, we try to respond to this question on the basis of our studies on the judgment of the passage of time and its links with the judgment of physical durations. The awareness of the passage of time when consciousness is altered by meditation is also discussed. A dissociation is then made among the "self-time perspective," the "self-duration" (internal duration), and the "world-duration" (external duration). A link is also established between the self-time perspective and the "narrative self," on one hand, and the self-duration and the "minimal self," on the other hand, that is confirmed in our qualitative analysis of testimonials of four meditators. The awareness of self-duration is thus related to the awareness of the embodied self. When the sense of self is altered and the consciousness of the body is lower, then the subjective experience of internal time changes. However, the mechanisms allowing the disappearance of the self with the feeling of being outside time during meditation remains to be elucidated.
French novelist and playwright Françoise Sagan plays with the word time. She uses the same word, time, to mean different things. Similarly, this word is used by researchers from different disciplines (physics, biology, history, philosophy, etc.), but they do not study the same time; they do not talk about the same time. Some of them study external physical time, others an internal biological time. Others work on historical time on a scale of several centuries or a scale of years of life. Still others work on the representation of time through the movement of our watches or through our own awareness of the passage of time. Faced with the polysemy of the word time and the confusion it may produce in our simple minds, the French physicist Etienne Klein wrote a book on "time and its arrow" (Klein & Spiro, 1994) . He also speaks at various universities, asking "Who has the authority to talk properly about time?" (Université de Nantes, 2017). His response is obviously "the physicists," with the deep conviction that he is on the right side, that is, rooted in hard science and not in soft science, such as psychology. However, everyone is justified in talking about time, provided that they can define the type of time they are studying and the processes that underlie it (Gruber, Smith, & Block, 2018) .
The question is what do humans mean when they say that time passes quickly or slowly? Just a few years ago, one of the most famous researchers into psychological time, John Wearden (2015) , said that we do not know exactly what humans verbally report regarding their feeling of the passage of time. Indeed, few researchers have used experimental methods to investigate this feeling of the passage of time that emerges in human beings' consciousness. The aim of this article is to present our recent experimental studies on the subjective experience of time, its changes with aging, its links with the judgment of physical durations, and the way it changes in a different state of awareness, that is, in mindfulness meditation. Indeed, the results of our studies, as well as those of others, allow us to better define the processes underlying the subjective experience of an acceleration or a slowing down of the passage of time.
The awareness of the passage of time and its changes with aging
With aging, we do not lose our primary sense of time, except in the case of a neurodegenerative illness, such as Alzheimer's disease. Indeed, we live in a dynamic environment, and our brains, composed of different neuro-oscillators, are designed to process the flow of information in time: that is, the physical duration of events or the interval between two events (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Buonomano, 2017; Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 2013) . Temporal performance therefore remains stable over the years. However, this stability in temporal performance across ages is observed in implicit time judgment tasks, when time is processed automatically, but not in explicit time judgment tasks when time is at the heart of consciousness and must be judged verbally (Droit-Volet, Lorandi, & Coull, 2019) . The temporal estimates of older people are indeed more variable in explicit tasks (e.g., Lamotte & Droit-Volet, 2017; Lustig & Meck, 2001; Xu & Church, 2017) . However, recent studies have shown that the predictors of the age-related variance in time estimates lie in cognitive abilities (working memory, attention), which decrease with aging, rather than in basic mechanisms used to measure durations (e.g., Chauvin, Gillebert, Rohenkohl, Humphreys, & Nobre, 2016; Droit-Volet et al., 2019; Turgeon, Lustig, & Meck, 2016) . Therefore, differences in time judgments with aging mainly appear when people have to think about time and overtly talk about time.
At the verbal level, older people often say that time passes faster now than before, that time passes faster as they grow older (Friedman & Janssen, 2010; Janssen, 2017; Janssen, Naka, & Friedman, 2013; Wittmann & Lehnhoff, 2005) . Some researchers have tried to explain this phenomenon by suggesting that it is due to the slowing down of the internal clock with aging, or the decrease with aging in the amount of attention devoted to time, or the number of memories recalled. However, the statement that time passes faster as we get older is quite paradoxical. It is "the time paradox of our grandmothers." Our grandmothers say that time passes faster, but when we visit them, they feel that time stretches out, drags on. We recently decided to further examine the psychological reality of this feeling by assessing it in the everyday life of young and old people on the basis of the experience sampling method (ESM; Droit-Volet, 2016; Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2015 . In accordance with the ESM, the participants kept a mobile phone on them for 5 days and this rang 8 times per day. During each call, they had to respond to a series of questions: one on the speed of the passage of time, and the other on their emotional states (happiness/sadness, calmness/excitement) and their activities, indicating whether these were difficult and captured all their attention. Our results did not show any effect of age on the passage-oftime judgment (PoT judgment). In other words, the experience of the pace of time did not differ between the young and old participants. The only differences in the PoT judgment originated from the emotions felt by the participants. Whatever their age, the participants reported that time was going faster when they felt happier or more nervous/excited. By contrast, they described a slowing down of time when they felt sad and when their level of alertness was decreased. The difficulty of the activity was also a good predictor of the PoT judgment but not sufficiently robust to be observed in all studies. This is probably due to the great interindividual variability in the activities performed. Recently, Tipples (2018) also identified the feeling of frustration as a factor, that is, when the achievement of objectives was delayed.
Finally, as far as the feeling of the passage of time with aging is concerned, there are two types of judgment: the "retrospective passage-of-time judgment over the life course" and the "present passage-of-time judgment." For the first type of judgment, the participants judge the passage of time on a long scale of several years: 5 or 10 years. In this time perspective, they effectively report that time passes faster, because they deduce that their life expectancy on earth is now shorter than it previously was. The second type of judgment is the experience of the passage of time in the present. As we will see below, this judgment depends on what we have done and what we feel. The present passage-of-time judgment (present PoT judgment) therefore depends on us, our personalities, our internal states, and not on our ages per se. However, when we get "very" old (>75 years), "what we are" is profoundly linked to our health or what we can do. Therefore, after this age, the present PoT judgment varies significantly with age (DroitVolet, 2016) . In fact, very old people do not experience an acceleration but a slowing down of time. This slowing down of the passage of time even appears to be greater in elderly people who have experienced a loss of autonomy and who live in a nursing home. Furthermore, our results indicate that their subjective feeling that time seems to drag is significantly related to the increase in the feeling of sadness, as in depressed people. In other words, the variation in the feeling of the passage of time is nested in the immediate consciousness of our internal states.
The dissociation between the awareness of the passage of time and the judgment of physical durations
Studies on aging suggest that the processes underlying the judgment of the passage of time are different from those involved in the judgment of durations, or at least of short durations, using the internal clock system described in the time perception literature. This has been demonstrated in an experiment in which the PoT judgment and the judgment of physical durations were tested simultaneously (Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2016) . In our experiment using the ESM, the participants had not only to judge the speed of the passage of time, but also to produce and verbally estimate some short stimulus durations from 200 to 2000 ms. The results of this experiment did not show any significant relationship between the PoT judgment and the duration judgment. The PoT judgment did not make it possible to predict the judgment of durations at a significant level and, conversely, the duration judgment did not make it possible to predict the PoT judgment. Therefore, it is not because the participants reported an acceleration in the flow of time that they overestimated or underestimated external durations. This result has been replicated with longer durations of up to 30 s (Droit-Volet, Trahanias, & Maniadakis, 2017) . This confirms that the PoT judgment and the judgment of short physical durations are based on different mechanisms. Consequently, even if an internal clock system automatically provides the raw material for the judgment of short physical durations (Wearden, 2016) , the PoT judgment does not require this system or does not directly depend on it. Obviously, this does not mean that the PoT judgment cannot influence the judgment of physical durations (Droit-Volet, 2018) . For example, participants, who are conscious of being subject to time distortions in their appraisal of the passage of time are also more accurate in their judgment of stimulus durations (Lamotte, Izaute, & Droit-Volet, 2012) . In addition, and as discussed at the end of this article, the basic common mechanisms related to attention and its different modes can similarly affect the judgment of duration and that of the passage of time.
More recently, Droit-Volet and colleagues tested the relationship between the PoT judgment and the duration judgment on a longer time scale of several minutes, namely between 2 and 8 min in one experiment, and between 8 and 32 min in another one . At this temporal scale, these two forms of judgment are related. The judgment of the passage of time even becomes a good predictor of verbal estimates of long durations. This significant correlation suggests that there are mechanisms that are common to these two forms of judgment at this temporal scale. The judgment of long durations necessarily requires some forms of long-term memory process. The retrospective judgment of time is to a great extent reconstructed in memory from non-temporal information (number of perceived changes, memory load, activity segmentation; Block & Zakay, 1997) . These retrospective memory processes could thus also play a key role in the feeling of the passage of time. The question is: what is retrospectively used to be able to say that time has passed quickly or slowly?
The awareness of the passage of time resulting from a retrospective analysis of our internal states: Emotion and body states
The results of the studies reported above on the correlation between the PoT judgment and the duration judgment at different time scales suggest that the cognitive processes involved in the PoT judgment are slow, because this type of judgment is a conscious one-"a reportable subjective experience" (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011, p. 200 )-which requires high-level controlled cognitive processes (topdown) that are both intentional and effortful. For very short durations of a few milliseconds, we therefore have no awareness of the passage of time. Obviously, we can give a verbal judgment on the speed of the passage of time for all durations. We can say that the duration of a stimulus of 300 ms is too brief and that the duration of 600 ms is longer than that of 300 ms. Nevertheless, at this temporal scale, we do not access the conscious experience of lasting, that is, the feeling of an extension of our internal duration (Droit-Volet, 2018) . We assume that the PoT judgment derives from a conscious self-assessment (introspective analysis) of our internal state during the period to be estimated: emotion, bodily signals, cognitive and physical effort. Indeed, our studies have shown that the best predictor of the PoT judgment is one's subjective emotional feeling, which leads to the impression that time goes fast when we feel happy (DroitVolet et al., 2017; Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2015 . The PoT judgment could thus simply reflect our subjective experience of changes in our internal state, which we call the "internal duration" or the self in time ("self-duration") as suggested by Minkowski (1968) . However, to be able to declare that time passes faster or slower than usual when we "observe" our internal duration, we necessarily use a temporal reference scale. This reference scale is the "external duration" ("world-duration"), such as it is conceived of by humans. This external time is not perceived as deformable-"elastic"-as our internal time is. According to Newton, it is conceived of as a flow with a constant and homogeneous rate that runs regardless of the events that fill it, such as the movement of our watches. The comparison between our internal duration (self-duration) and this representation of external duration (world-duration) therefore leads one to say that time goes faster or slower.
Depressed people, who experience an internal slowing down, state that the passage of time runs slowly (Ratcliffe, 2012) . Their PoT judgments would therefore result from their comparison between their self-duration and their representation of the world-duration, that is, their state after and before their illness, or their rhythm compared with the faster rhythm of other people. However, one can suppose that if everyone in the world followed the philosophy of life of "slow movement," depressed people might express their pain (if it persists) differently, that is, not in temporal terms. However, human beings remain aware that the duration of their life on earth is limited and we are often aware of wasting time. As Heidegger (1927) explained, human beings are aware of their finite nature, of their death. And this awareness necessarily affects PoT judgments in their everyday lives. In a new slow-moving society, depressed people might thus perhaps continue to say that time passes slowly. The verbal judgment of the passage of time can thus be made at two levels. At the first level, the PoT judgment is based on an analysis of our internal duration in comparison to an external duration, thereby allowing individuals to declare that time goes faster or slower. At the second level, the PoT judgment is based on temporal localization of the self on the lifeline (past-present-future) . This is what some researchers call the "time perspective" (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) or the "temporal horizon," and what we can call "the self-time perspective." This is thus a judgment of the temporal present placed on the lifeline in comparison with the past and the future, and their length. The difficulty is to identify the level that individuals refer to when they talk about the passage of time. Do they simply describe the changes in their immediate experience (internal-duration/ self-duration)? Do they describe external time compared to their own internal time? Do they judge the present time on the basis of a time perspective (past-present-future)? The feeling that time drags can thus result from the simple description of our own internal duration (sadness, drowsiness), or from the comparison between external time and internal duration (in this case, external time is judged to pass faster), or from the judgment of present time in a time perspective.
The awareness of the passage of time when consciousness is altered by meditation
The consciousness of being in one's immediate duration and one's own time perspective therefore lies at the core of the judgment of the passage of time. We thus decided to conduct some experiments on mindfulness meditation in order to produce an altered state of consciousness and examine its effects on the judgment of physical durations and the judgment of the passage of time. Our results showed that the practice of a mindfulness meditation exercise (body scan or breathing exercise) changes the PoT judgment DroitVolet, Chaulet, & Dambrun, 2018; Droit-Volet & Heros, 2017) . More specifically, the passage of time is judged to go faster with a meditation exercise than with another control exercise. We thus lose our sense of time when we meditate. We talk about "timelessness." The phenomenon of timelessness has been described in numerous other studies on meditation with highly experienced meditators (Berkovich-Ohana, Dor-Ziderman, Glicksohn, & Goldstein, 2013; Otten et al., 2015; Schötz et al., 2016; Thönes & Wittmann, 2016; Wittmann et al., 2014 Wittmann et al., , 2015 . However, does this feeling of being outside of time (timelessness) with a meditation exercise necessary indicate a disruption/ stop of the processing of physical durations in all conditions when meditators practice meditation? When the short stimulus durations were delivered after a meditation exercise with students (Droit-Volet, Fanget, & Dambrun, 2015; Kramer, Weger, & Sharma, 2013) and experienced meditators or during a meditation exercise with students and meditators (Droit-Volet & Heros, 2017) , the results showed that a mindfulness meditation exercise improves the precision of judgment of physical durations in all participants. Indeed, the practice of mindfulness meditation decreases anxiety (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992) and improves individual attention-controlling abilities (Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbach, 2012; Moore & Malinowski, 2009) , with the result that participants are less variable in their temporal estimates. Some temporal bias in duration judgments can also be observed in these experimental conditions. The stimulus durations were indeed underestimated and overestimated when they were delivered during and after the meditation exercise, respectively. These time distortions revealed that meditation is a high attention-demanding task, in the first case, and improved the attention-control capacities, in the second case. Indeed, these time distortions are mainly explained by the speed of attention switching between two different activities or activities that bring forward the start of time processing. The results of these studies thus demonstrate that some attention mechanisms underlie the effect of meditation on time judgments. However, although the effect of meditation can persist for a certain time, the problem in these studies on judgments of short physical durations is that the participants must leave their meditative state in order to judge time. This is a methodological question that emphasizes the difficulty of investigating the effects of deep meditation on the judgment of short physical stimulus durations. The results may be more convincing in experimental situations when participants have to judge temporal intervals during which they have meditated. We recently performed a study in which participants trained in meditation were asked to judge the duration of meditation periods going from 15 s to 60 s. In this condition, the duration of the temporal interval was underestimated when a mindfulness meditation exercise was performed (body scan or breathing exercise) compared to another control exercise (DroitVolet, Chaulet, & . This confirms the critical role of attention in the effects of meditation on time judgment. Consistently, the participants reported that time passed faster during the meditation than during the control exercise. In a more recent study in which we analyzed the correlations between different verbal reports on time, space, and body, we found that this feeling of an acceleration of the passage of time is linked to the feeling of timelessness in participants trained in meditation . The more participants felt that they were outside time, the faster they felt that time passed. The feelings of being outside time and of time passing faster were also significantly related to the feeling of being in the present and of being less in the past or the future. This confirms that a mindfulness exercise leads all participants to be more focused on the present and less on the past and the future (Droit-Volet & Heros, 2017) . This is entirely consistent with the results obtained from long-term meditation practitioners (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013; Hafenbrack, Kinias, & Barsade, 2014; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Wittmann et al., 2015) or mindful individuals, all of whom are more focused on the present than other individuals (Weiner, Wittmann, Bertschy, & Giersch, 2016; Wittmann et al., 2014) . In addition, the feeling of timelessness was intimately related to the perception of the body in space, that is, the sense of self. In sum, the verbal report of an acceleration of time with meditation means being outside time. As we will see, this feeling of being outside time is closely linked to the perception of the sense of self within a time perspective (self-time perspective).
The sense of self and its relationship to the judgment of the passage of time
The sense of time in terms of internal duration (self-duration) and self-time perspective seems to be closely related to the sense of self (see also Ataria & Neria, 2013; BerkovichOhana et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2015) . However, in psychology, the sense of the self is a complex notion underlying several dimensions (Damasio, 2012; Gallagher, 2000) . Gallagher (2013) mentions eight distinct self-dimensions. However, since James (1890 James ( /1950 , a distinction has been made between the "narrative self " and the "minimal self " (Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn, 2014; Gallagher, 2000) . The narrative self refers to a conceptual mental activity that consists of describing the self (concept of self ) extended in time, that is, the "various stories that we or others tell about ourselves," involving memories about the past and projections into the future (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15) . The minimal self is "a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience." It refers to the "I." It is assessed through several aspects of the relationship between one's self and one's body, that is, the sense of agency, ownership, and location (Blanke, 2012; Gallagher, 2000) . The sense of agency is the sense that we are the original initiators of our movements, our actions. For instance, we are aware that we are initiating a particular arm movement in order to pick up a given coffee cup (under the individual's control). The sense of ownership is the awareness that it is our body, that our body, our hand, belongs to us. The sense of self-location is the awareness of our body in a given position in space (e.g., Guterstam, Björnsdotter, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2015; Serino et al., 2013) . After this definition of different dimensions of the sense of self, we can easily understand the close relationship between the narrative self and the self-time perspective. The feeling of the passage of time through the self-time perspective is the verbal judgment of present time in relation to the past and the future, while taking life duration into account. It is thus the temporal perspective of the narrative self. Depressed people can thus say that time passes slowly because they are mired in a present that does not move forward, while the remaining life span is shortened. As regards internal duration (self-duration), it is more related to the minimal self, as these two dimensions are "a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience" (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15) . The scope of the minimal self is here and now, but it is not extended in the time perspective (past, present, future). The feeling of the passage of time linked to internal duration is also not "extended in time," in the way that it is not affected by the time perspective (past-present-future), but is extended in the present time (present duration). As has been suggested, it is the awareness of bodily changes in duration (that may be related to emotional states), the feeling of lasting, the feeling of slowing down and acceleration. This raises a new question: What is the temporal span of the present (temporal interval) considered by individuals in their judgment of the passage of time? Does it consist of the anchor points (start and end) of the activity/task being carried out or of other shorter periods (activity fragmentation), or of a succession of temporal windows of consciousness? The difficulty of reaching the end of a task (goal) can, for example, produce the feeling that time is dragging (Tipples, 2018) . As far as the consciousness of the body in the minimal self is concerned, other questions can be asked: What is the relationship between the narrative and the minimal self and the PoT judgment? What dimension(s) of the minimal self (sense of agency, ownership, self-location) affect the PoT judgment? In this article, we present the results of interviews with longterm meditation practitioners, which allow us to better describe the changes experienced by meditators in their narrative self, their minimal self, and their sense of time. Indeed, in the scientific approach of trying to understand a phenomenon, it is important to start interviewing very experienced meditators, because their state of timelessness is probably different from the feeling of timelessness reported by our subjects trained in the practice of meditation.
Altered sense of self and timelessness:
Testimonials of expert meditators
For this study, we recruited four meditators. The first one, V.T., a female aged 40 years, is an experienced practitioner in Zen Buddhism (tradition of Thich Nath Hanh). She has practiced for about 6 years, and has accumulated about 1,400 hr of formal sitting practice, the main traditional practice of which is informal mindfulness (i.e., the process of keeping one's consciousness alive to one's present experiences and reality in everyday life). The second participant, M.L., was also a female, aged 59 years. She is a long-term practitioner of the Theravada Vipassana tradition. She has practiced for about 30 years, and has accumulated about 12,700 hr of formal sitting practice. She has also practiced Hatha Yoga (20 years). J.-L.R., the third participant, was a 68-year-old male. He is a long-term practitioner of the Theravada Vipassana tradition. He has practiced for about 20 years, and has accumulated about 11,450 hr of formal sitting practice. He has also practiced both Hatha Yoga (40 years) and Pranayama Yoga (6 months). The fourth participant, A.G., a male aged 59, is also a long-term practitioner of the Theravada Vipassana tradition. He has practiced for about 34 years, and has accumulated about 18,200 hr of formal sitting practice. He has also practiced Nidra Yoga (5 years). The interview was divided into two phases with the same series of questions for each phase. In the first phase, the questions were nevertheless related to everyday life and, in the second phase, to the time of the interview. For the second phase, the participants were asked to think about a deep meditative state they had experienced (see Appendix). To help them, they were invited to enter into a state of meditation in order to be reconnected with sensations associated with this deep meditative state. The second phase of the interview started when the participants were ready, and the questions were thus focused on the state of deep meditation.
The questions used in the interview were divided into three subsections linked to (a) the narrative self, (b) the minimal self, and (c) the sense of time (see Appendix). For the narrative self, there were some questions on the selfconcept/personality and then on mind-wandering. The participants had to say how they perceived themselves and how they described themselves in everyday life (i.e., selfconcept, personality). They also had to indicate what generally occupied their minds during the day (i.e., mind-wandering). This set of questions involved some questions on the time perspective (present-, future-oriented). For the minimal self, there were specific questions on each dimension of the minimal self: (1) the sense of agency (i.e., "What is your sensation concerning the control of your body and your movements? Do you feel that you are the control tower?"), (2) the sense of ownership (i.e., "To what extent do you have the sensation of being this body?"), and (3) self-location (i.e., "Currently, where are you localized, where is your 'I'?"). The questions about time related to their everyday experience of time, for example "How fast does time go?", and "How was time present or absent in your mind?"
Alteration of the narrative self
The results concerning the narrative self are presented in Table 1 . As expected, the four participants described themselves mainly in terms of personality traits (e.g., "I am calm, reserved") in their daily life. Two of the participants also used self-judgments (M.L., A.G.) and one used values (V.T.). In the meditative state, the results contrast enormously, since all the participants indicated that their personal identity had disappeared (M.L., J.-L.R., A.G.), or at least said that they were unable to describe themselves (V.T.). The results concerning how their minds were occupied also indicated a reduction/extinction of the narrative self during the meditative state. Linked to this decrease of the narrative self during the meditative state, all the participants reported a reduction or extinction of thoughts, while in their daily life, V.T. and M.L experienced a lot of thoughts, and were mainly future-oriented, whereas J.-L.R. and A.G. experienced calmness and few thoughts. In sum, these results reveal a strong attenuation of the narrative self during deep meditation. This is consistent with the work of Mrazek, Smallwood, and Schooler (2012) revealing a reduction in mind-wandering during a brief mindfulness meditation exercise. It is also consistent with the Consciousness State Space model developed by Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn (2014), which predicts that altered states of consciousness, such as a deep meditative state, lead to a transition from the narrative self toward the minimal self, with less activity in the neural space related to the narrative self. Table 2 presents the meditators' responses for the three dimensions of the minimal self: agency, ownership, and self-location. With regard to the sense of agency, three meditators had a strong sense of agency in their daily life. The exception was A.G., who experienced a lower sense of control. However, the meditative state completely changed this feeling. All the participants reported that they perceived the autonomy of their body (e.g., "There's no more head," "The body lives its own life," and "The body moves alone"). This sensation is related to a sense of immobility ("I do not need to move," "My body is quiet, it does not move," and "I am in a kind of immobile nucleus"). The sense of agency is consistently found to decrease drastically or even to totally disappear. In other words, the sense of agency is not present in a deep meditative state. This corroborates Ataria, Dor-Ziderman, and Berkovich-Ohana's (2015) case study of a meditation expert who reported a complete loss of sense of agency in the deepest stage of meditation: "There is no sense of controlling" (p. 142).
Alteration of the minimal self
As regards the sense of ownership, two participants indicated a strong feeling of being their body during daily life (M.L. and A.G.), as do most other individuals. However, two others reported a moderate (V.T.) or weak (J.-L.R.) body identification. The sense of ownership in the meditation experts was thus quite varied in daily life. However, during the meditative state, three of the meditators clearly indicated a considerable reduction of the sense of ownership (Table 2) . A.G.'s verbal report was more difficult to interpret. It seems that he continued to identify with his body. However, at the same time, he evoked a perspective change toward a position of observer, a sort of metaawareness (see also Dahl, Lutz, & Davidson, 2015) . Whatever the case, this echoes the loss of the sense of ownership described by the meditator interviewed by Ataria et al. (2015) , who said: "There is no sense of mine, there is no sense of me" (p. 142).
In everyday life, our participating meditators were able to provide a location for their "I" (self-location, Table 2 ): V.T. and A.G indicated the torso, and M.L. the head. J.-L. R. saw himself as an actor, without localization in the body. These verbal reports confirm Alsmith and Longo's (2014) work suggesting that self-location judgments are mainly distributed over the upper face (e.g., the head) or the upper torso (e.g., heart, chest). Interestingly, in the meditative state, while all the participants exhibited an alteration of self-location, they all experienced different things. It is important to mention that all the participants had difficulties in locating themselves during the meditative state (see M.L.). By searching, they obviously found something, but maybe it was artificial and wrong. Indeed, it is difficult to find a location of the self when in a state of low body awareness. In fact, the question about self-location seems problematic. However, in the case reported by Ataria On a daily basis, I work to move from control to observation. However, I have a pretty strong feeling of controlling the body.
There's no more head. Total loss of the sensation of control.
J.-L.R. I feel that I have good control over my body. Strong enough.
My body is quiet, it does not move. Feeling, no longer feeling the body. There is no need to control it anymore. Total loss of sensation of body control sensation. It is autonomous. No control tower. A.G. While I'm talking to you, interfering automatic movements are possible because my consciousness is more mental, in the intellect. On a daily basis, I am interested to observe spontaneous movements. My feeling of control is rather moderate, weak.
Acuity becomes fine, consciousness increases. I perceive myself in my whole, not just a part, the totality. I am in a kind of immobile nucleus. The body lives its own life; autonomous. Total absence of control of the body.
Minimal Self: Sense of ownership V.T. I have a moderate feeling of being this body. Very low feeling of being this body. M.L.
Yes, I totally feel that I am this body. Not at all. I do not feel at all that I am this body.
No, my feeling of being this body is pretty weak. Weak, even weaker. A.G.
Strong feeling of being this body. I am the body and I am the observer. Minimal Self: Self-location V.T.
My body, my chest, torso.
As an observer. Rather above, above, very slightly behind. M.L.
In my head. I don't know. There is no more body, so the location is complicated. J.-L.R.
Me as an actor, not the body.
In general, rather in the third eye. A.G.
My abdomen. I am probably localized in my sensations.
et al. (2015), the meditator clearly described an absence of self-location. For example, he said: "There is really no address. I have no idea where I am in stage three (the deepest one), it's all background, I'm not there basically … so there's no real location" (p. 141). His testimony is quite similar to that of M.L. who said: "I don't know. There is no longer any body, so the location is complicated." The other three meditators indicated where their perception was: the position of the "observer, above, very slightly behind" (V.T.); and "the third eye," which is an object of concentration in focused-attention meditation (J.-L.R.).
In conclusion, the meditators clearly described a subjective experience of an altered awareness of their narrative and their minimal selves in the deep meditative state, while their dimensions of self are not modified in everyday life, except perhaps in the case of A.G. In addition, the alteration of the minimal self was produced by a loss of sense of body, namely a sense of agency and ownership. The disruption of sense of self-location was nevertheless less clear. Table 3 presents the results on the sense of time. Three participants clearly indicated that their internal time (self-duration) is elastic and depends on their daily activities. However, the meditators did not experience a speeding up of time in their daily lives. The speed of the passage of time was judged as moderate by M.L. and J.-L.R., and quite fast by V.T. However, both M.L. and J.-L.R. explicitly mentioned that the present moment is more and more important in their daily lives. Finally, only, A.G. mentioned that he often lost the sensation of time in his daily life.
Alteration of the sense of time
During the meditative state, the results are clearer and very consistent. All the participants indicated that time disappeared completely, that it was no longer possible to judge its speed because it was literally absent. As they said, they were somewhat "outside of time." This is consistent with the phenomenological experience of time reported by most long-term meditation practitioners (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013) . However, J.-L.R. and A.G. added that it was possible to give an estimation of the speed of time during meditation once they had left the state of meditation. At the end of a period in a deep state of meditation, the feeling of the passage of time was that it had passed very quickly. By way of an example, A.G. said that at the end of a session of deep meditation he would have the impression that he had passed 1 hr, but that in reality he had passed two. A.G. also described a physiological slowing down, which gives him the impression that his internal duration is slower than the external duration. These results on time are consistent with the data of experimental studies on meditation showing an underestimation of temporal intervals during which participants meditated, and the subjective feeling that time goes faster (Droit-Volet, Monceau, Berthon, Trahanias, & Maniadakis, 2018; Wittmann, 2015) . Consequently, this subjective experience of time is similar in all meditators who have been practicing meditation for a shorter or longer time. In sum, the subjective experience of time changes in the deep meditative state, with the meditators reporting that they are outside time and that time goes faster.
Conclusion: What are the mechanisms underlying time-self link when consciousness is altered?
The introduction to the "Yoga-sûtras of Patanjali, YogaSara-Samgraha" (Sablé, 2015) states the following: The real nature of time is revealed to the yogi who meditates on the succession of moments. He understands that the flow from the past to the future, which seems to be the foundation of time, is an illusory construction. It is used as a basis for measuring time, but has no reality. The interiorized yogi knows that only a single present moment exists, which is transformed, modified, to give the illusion of a flow. The perception of a tree follows that of a memory of our childhood, then comes the singing of a bird in the courtyard. If we are sufficiently attentive, we realize that these perceptions or thoughts follow one another in the consciousness, an immutable state of presence. They are born and disappear one after the other without there being any past or future. It is the contrast between its different representations that gives the feeling of the passage of time. So these are not the events that take place within time, but they create time. They are phenomena that follow one another on the surface of an unchanging reality. As Vacaspati Misra says, the world presents itself as a unique moment that is transformed and presents sometimes one face, sometimes another. (Sablé, 2015, pp. 18-19) We are convinced that studying the effect on time judgments of different states of consciousness induced by different types of meditation is a successful approach allowing us to better understand the subjective feeling of time. However, the idea of time considered by meditation practitioners often corresponds to the self-time perspective of the narrative self. As regards this self-time perspective, the results of our interviews, together with those of numerous other studies on meditation, show that the practice of meditation allows individuals to be more oriented toward the present, and less toward the past and the future. In other words, the time perspective leaves their mind. There is therefore a transition from a narrative self toward a state of present-moment attention (Berkovich-Ohana & Glicksohn, 2014) . We can thus suggest that meditators report this change in temporal perspective by saying that they are outside of time, outside the time perspective involved in the narrative self.
In the present moment, only the internal duration (selfduration) is important. And, at this temporal level, the results of our interviews support the idea that the subjective judgment of this internal duration is closely linked to the minimal self, which depends on our subjective experience of body (Ataria & Neria, 2013; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2015) . Therefore, when a meditation exercise alters the awareness of the minimal self, it also alters the subjective feeling of internal duration and, in turn, the judgment of the passage of time. Recently, BerkovichOhana et al. (2013) used magnetoencephalography to record brain activity in long-term meditators who were asked to enter into a state of timelessness (outside time; "Try to be in the present moment," "Try to be outside time") and spacelessness ("Try to be here," "Try not to be in the center of space"). In these experimental conditions, they showed that, despite some differences in brain topography between these two states, there are overlapped brain regions (bilateral cingulate cortex, left cerebellum, right temporoparietal junction), and that these regions are involved in bodily awareness. Therefore, the feeling of being outside time as concerned the self-duration is related to mechanisms underlying body processing.
Interestingly, the cerebral regions activated in timelessness are known to be involved in the awareness of the body, but, as Berkovich-Ohana et al. (2013) have said, these regions also "include motor areas (postcentral gyrus) spreading into the supplementary motor area (SMA), parietal lobule, thalamus and basal ganglia" (p. 13). We now acknowledge the critical role of motor areas, especially the SMA, in the processing of duration (Coull, Charras, Donadieu, Droit-Volet, & Vidal, 2015; Coull & Droit-Volet, 2018; Coull, Vidal, & Burle, 2016) . Moreover, several studies have shown some time distortions when participants are in the course of perceiving or executing a movement (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2016; Hagura, Kanai, Orgs, & Haggard, 2012; Hallez & Droit-Volet, 2018; Nather, Bueno, Bigand, & Droit-Volet, 2011) . A movement of greater amplitude or requiring more effort is indeed judged to last longer. In our study, when we questioned meditators about the sense of agency during the state of deep meditation, three out of the four participants described a feeling of immobility (i.e., a total absence of movement). The feeling of a slowing down of internal time could thus lie in the perception of the motionlessness of the body. However, rather than the mere lack of movement, this report of immobility seems to reflect a process of decentering from the body as an "I." For example, one participant reported being in another dimension, characterized by immobility, without feeling involved in the body's activities: "I am in a kind of immobile nucleus. The body lives its own life." (A.G.).
Finally, our data, like those of other researchers (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013; Wittmann, 2015 Wittmann, , 2018 suggest a close connection, at the level of consciousness, between the embodiment of the self and temporal feelings. When the self is altered and consciousness of the body is lower, then the feeling of flow of the internal duration changes. However, establishing this link (i.e., the idea that the impression of time depends on our bodily signals) does not allow us to identify what mechanism(s) is (are) at the root of these phenomenological experiences. We are in the very early days of experimental studies on altered consciousness and the judgment of time, and further studies must be carried out. Nevertheless, among the possible mechanisms, we can evoke two of them: one related to physiological activity and the other to attention, as attention is well known to shape consciousness (Watzl, 2017) .
As far as physiological activity is concerned, one participant reported a state of physiological slowdown. It has indeed been demonstrated that states of meditation decrease the level of cortical and autonomic arousal (Woolfolk, 1975) . They also modify cardiac activity (Ditto, Eclache, & Goldman, 2006; Takahashi et al., 2005) , and decrease the heart and respiratory rates (Telles, Nagarathna, & Nagendra, 1995; Wielgosz, Schuyler, Lutz, & Davidson, 2016) . We can thus assume that this physiological slowing down, with its associated bodily signals, would determine the judgment of the self which, in turn, would influence the judgment of time. This idea is defended in the theory of the embodiment of time (Droit-Volet, 2014; Effron, Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2006; Wittmann, 2014) , with the insula-an interoceptive region (Craig, 2009 )-playing a critical role in duration judgments (Wittmann, van Wassenhove, Craig, & Paulus, 2010) . However, there is no consensus in the literature concerning the key role of the insula in the different forms of time judgments (see Mella et al., 2018) , and the direct link between physiological activity and time judgments has not yet been clearly established, although numerous studies have already shown the effects of the increase of arousal on the judgment of physical durations, namely in emotional contexts (Droit-Volet, 2018) . Nevertheless, we can agree on the fact that the awareness of the self-duration is related to the awareness of the embodied self, with a critical role of the insula (Craig, 2009 ), but these judgments at the consciousness level are not based on the same mechanisms as those involved in the judgment of short physical durations.
As far as attention is concerned, we can also suggest that the sense of self and that of time change concomitantly during a meditation exercise due to its general effect on attention (i.e., the controlling attention; see Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, & Goldstein, 2012) . During the mindfulness meditation exercises used in our studies (i.e., focusedattention meditations), attention is focused either on each part of the body (body scan) or on the breathing rhythm. When attention is narrow, we focus our attention on each item of information (each object, each part of the body). We thus perceive each body part separately, each detail of a scene separately. Each thing is clearly identified and has a clear boundary in time and space. However, surprisingly enough, in this attentional condition, the sense of self becomes more diffuse with the practice of meditation (focused-attention meditation), with the saliency of body boundaries decreasing significantly (Dambrun, 2016; Dambrun & Ricard, 2011) . In particular, this decrease in body boundaries seems to be associated with timelessness and spacelessness ). In addition, statistical analyses have revealed that all of these dimensions (body, time, space, emotion) initially separated become fused in one dimension (one component) during a meditation exercise. This produces the feeling of unity: "The body is one with its environment." This can explain the difficulty experienced by researchers in identifying one single major factor/dimension (motion, agency, etc.) in phenomenal experience during meditation, as all the dimensions are altered together due to a change in the general attentional state. However, the attentional mechanisms underlying this diffusion of the self remain to be clarified. Our results only allow us to suggest that meditation is an intense attention-controlling/monitoring activity that impacts the sense of self and that of time.
In sum, we can assume that the subjective experience of internal time results from an introspective analysis of our internal states that depend on the context: emotion and body state. The relationship between emotion and selfsense and its role in time judgments now needs to be further examined to better understand our results on emotion obtained in the everyday life and those on the self obtained in altered states of consciousness induced by meditation, although emotional state changes with the minimal self. Nevertheless, the studies on meditation suggest a vital link between the sense of time and the sense of body that is embedded in the embodied self (i.e., in the minimal self ). However, we do not know clearly which dimension(s) of the self (our body) most greatly influence the judgment of time: the sense of agency, that of ownership, or that of selflocation. In addition, the problem of the mechanisms underlying/causing the phenomenological experience of body and time, and the links between them, still require further investigation. Several mechanisms, such as physiological arousal, have to be examined. Further experiments are thus needed to better understand what people mean when they say that time goes faster or slower. And studying the altered states of consciousness induced by meditation is a promising approach.
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